

The United States of Israel (U.S.I.): How Dispensational Theology and Truman’s Signature Fused a Superpower to the Holy Land

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This paper explores the emergence of what might be called the “United States of Israel” (U.S.I.): a de facto fusion of American power, Israeli statehood, and an eschatological story most citizens never consciously chose. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, John Nelson Darby’s dispensational scheme and the Scofield Reference Bible quietly rewrote large segments of American Protestant imagination. Within that system, a restored Israel in the Holy Land became not just a political option but a prophetic necessity and a test of fidelity to God’s plan. When President Harry Truman recognized the State of Israel within minutes of its declaration of independence in 1948, that theology found its geopolitical anchor. What had been a contested doctrinal innovation became, in effect, part of American civil religion and grand strategy. This paper traces how those threads—Darbyite dispensationalism, Scofield’s popularization, Truman’s decision, and Cold War realpolitik—intertwined to create an enduring identification between the U.S.A. and Israel. It also asks what happens when a superpower’s foreign policy toward a nuclear-armed ally is shaped as much by inherited prophecy charts as by public debate. Naming this hybrid formation “U.S.I.” helps us see both its historical contingency and its present power.

Keywords: United States of Israel, dispensationalism, Christian Zionism, Scofield Reference Bible, John Nelson Darby, Harry Truman, U.S.–Israel relations, political theology, civil religion, prophetic geopolitics, American evangelicalism, Holy Land, Cold War strategy

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1. Introduction: Naming the United States of Israel

The phrase “United States of Israel” is not a proposal for a literal, newly constituted state. It is a diagnostic metaphor for an already existing entanglement that has become so normalized it is almost invisible. The political, military, economic, and theological bonds between the United States of America and the State of Israel have evolved far beyond the formal language of alliance. In practice, they configure something more like a hybrid formation, in which each state’s identity, security assumptions, and moral narratives are deeply interwoven with the other. To name this hybrid “U.S.I.” is to draw a line around a phenomenon that operates at the level of policy, but is rooted just as much in theology, memory, and imagination.

Most citizens in either country did not consciously vote for this entanglement as such. American voters encounter it in the form of reflexive congressional resolutions, default budget allocations, and a bipartisan vocabulary of “shared values” and “unbreakable bonds.” Israeli citizens experience it as an almost taken-for-granted American backstop, a superpower that is not merely an ally but a kind of guarantor of existential survival. Underneath this political surface lies a century and a half of theological reconfiguration in the United States and a crucial presidential decision in the mid-twentieth century, both of which have anchored American power and Israeli statehood into a single narrative arc. The first task of this paper is simply to make that arc visible by giving it a name.

1.1 Coining “U.S.I.” as a descriptive and diagnostic term

“United States of Israel” is intentionally jarring. It violates ordinary categories, in which the United States is a continental superpower and Israel is a small state in a contested region. The point of the coinage is not to collapse their differences, but to highlight a curious set of convergences that function as if there were a single political-theological body with two institutional heads.

Descriptively, U.S.I. refers to the dense lattice of commitments that make it difficult to imagine the United States adopting a genuinely independent, interest-based posture toward Israel, or Israel imagining its security and regional strategy apart from an American umbrella. Diagnostic use goes further: U.S.I. draws attention to how specific theological innovations in American Protestantism, combined with specific decisions by American political leaders, have solidified into something that behaves like a fused entity. It is a way of asking why criticism of Israeli policy in American public life so often feels like treason, and why American domestic politics, including elections, can hinge on issues ostensibly about a foreign state.

The term also signals that this is not merely a story about lobbying, money, or cold strategic calculation. Those elements are real, but the U.S.I. formation is more than the sum of interest groups and institutional contracts. It rests on shared sacred narratives, prophetic expectations,

and moral self-descriptions that make the relationship feel pre-political and non-negotiable. By coining “U.S.I.,” the paper invites readers to notice where theology has quietly acted as constitutional law in shaping a superpower’s commitments.

1.2 From alliance to fusion: why a new name is needed

Standard vocabulary about the U.S.–Israel relationship speaks in terms of alliance, partnership, and shared values. These words are not wrong, but they are inadequate. An alliance is conceptually revisable: it can be recalibrated, suspended, or ended when interests diverge. The U.S.–Israel relationship, as it has been constructed since the mid-twentieth century, is treated not as revisable but as axiomatic. American politicians routinely describe support for Israel in language reserved for ultimate principles, and any suggestion of conditionality is framed as a moral failure rather than an ordinary policy disagreement.

This is where the notion of fusion becomes necessary. Fusion means that two systems, while still formally distinct, have interpenetrated each other’s core logics. In the case of U.S.I., this includes at least three layers. First, there is strategic fusion: shared intelligence, weapons programs, training, and operational doctrines that make the two militaries functionally dependent on one another in certain domains. Second, there is economic and technological fusion: joint ventures, research collaborations, and a dense ecosystem of firms and institutions that link Silicon Valley, the defense industry, and Israeli high-tech and security sectors. Third, and most importantly for this paper, there is theological and symbolic fusion: large segments of American Christianity interpret Israel’s existence and fate as a direct fulfillment of biblical prophecy, while Israeli narratives of legitimacy and chosenness find powerful echoes within American civil religion.

Naming this entire structure as U.S.I. is not meant to erase internal diversity or conflict within either nation. Rather, it foregrounds the fact that what is commonly described as a bilateral relationship functions more like a single hybrid actor on the world stage, especially in conflicts where Israel is centrally involved. A new name is needed not to inflame, but to clarify: it allows us to ask what it means when a democratic superpower’s foreign policy is constrained by an implicit theological covenant with another state.

1.3 Method and scope of the paper

This paper approaches U.S.I. as a historical and theological construction rather than as a conspiracy or inevitable destiny. It proceeds in three main moves. First, it reconstructs the theological prehistory of U.S.I. by tracing how nineteenth-century dispensationalism and the Scofield Reference Bible introduced a particular reading of Israel and the Holy Land into American Protestant consciousness. This reading did not simply interpret Scripture; it rewrote

the imagined timeline of history and assigned a central geopolitical role to a future Jewish state in Palestine.

Second, the paper examines the mid-twentieth-century moment in which these theological currents intersected with American political decision-making. It pays particular attention to the figure of Harry Truman and the recognition of the State of Israel, not to canonize or demonize him, but to understand how a combination of personal faith, postwar conscience, domestic politics, and emerging Cold War logic produced a binding act. This act gave institutional and symbolic weight to the theological currents already in circulation, effectively anchoring American power to the Holy Land.

Third, the analysis traces how this anchoring hardened into the contemporary U.S.I. formation through the Cold War and into the present, focusing on the interplay between Christian Zionist activism, pro-Israel lobbying, Congressional rhetoric, and the evolution of American civil religion. The scope of the paper is therefore both historical and diagnostic: it follows a specific genealogy from doctrinal innovation to political fusion and then reflects on the costs, blind spots, and possible alternatives. It does not attempt a comprehensive history of either nation, nor does it claim to speak for all believers or citizens. Its more modest goal is to show how a particular theological update, combined with a particular presidential signature, helped fuse a superpower to the Holy Land in ways that now shape global politics and constrain democratic choice.

2. Before Darby: Older Christian Views of Israel and the Land

To understand how striking the Darby–Scofield system really is, it helps to see how un-Darby-like most Christian thought about Israel and the land had been for nearly two millennia. Early Christian theologians did not imagine history as a chart of dispensations culminating in a restored nation-state in Palestine. Nor did they treat the political fate of the Jewish people as a central key to interpreting current events. Instead, they tended to read “Israel” primarily as a theological symbol, a people and story fulfilled in Christ and the Church. Differences and debates certainly existed, but there was a broad pattern: Scripture was interpreted typologically, and the land of Israel functioned more as a stage for salvation history than as an ongoing geopolitical project.

Across the patristic, medieval, Reformation, and early American periods, three currents are especially important for this paper. First, the development of supersessionist readings in which the Church is seen as the “new Israel” that fulfills and in some sense replaces the old. Second, the Reformation-era struggles to interpret covenant and election, including the meaning of Paul’s language about “all Israel” and the hard history of Christian anti-Judaism. Third, the ways

in which early American Protestants both carried this legacy with them and recast it, imagining themselves as a kind of transplanted Israel even as they saw actual Jews as marginal or missionary objects rather than political partners in a future restoration. These older patterns are the background against which the novelty of Darby's scheme will stand out.

2.1 Patristic and medieval readings: Israel as type, Church as fulfillment

In the first centuries of Christianity, theologians were grappling with a basic question: how to relate the story of Israel in what Christians came to call the Old Testament to the proclamation of Christ. The dominant answer took a typological form. Israel's exodus from Egypt, its wandering in the wilderness, its conquest of Canaan, and its experience of exile and return were all read as prefigurations of Christ and the life of the Church. "Israel" remained honored as the people through whom God had prepared the world for the Messiah, but its institutions and promises were understood as shadows fulfilled in the new covenant.

This reading eventually hardened into what is often called supersessionism: the idea that the Church, composed of Jews and Gentiles who believe in Christ, is the true continuation of Israel, and that the earlier forms of Israel's life (Temple, sacrifices, land-centered law) have been surpassed. The physical land of Israel retained symbolic importance as the place of Christ's life, death, and resurrection, and it remained a destination for pilgrims. Yet it did not occupy a central place in eschatological political speculation. The hope for the future was focused on the return of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, and the final judgment, not on a detailed program for Jewish national restoration.

In the medieval period, this pattern continued. Jews were often tolerated but marginalized in Christian societies, seen as living reminders of both God's faithfulness and Israel's failure to recognize Christ. The land of Israel came into focus above all during the Crusades, when Western rulers attempted to seize and hold Jerusalem. Yet even there, the logic was not that history demanded a permanent Jewish or Christian state in Palestine as a prophetic requirement. Rather, the land was viewed as holy because of its past, and its control was contested as a matter of Christian honor, pilgrimage, and power. The idea that the fate of a Jewish state in that land was the key to God's end-time timetable remained essentially foreign.

2.2 Reformation debates: covenant, election, and the Jews

The Protestant Reformation did not immediately overturn this basic structure, but it did reopen questions about covenant, law, grace, and election that touched directly on how Christians thought about Israel and the Jews. Reformers like Martin Luther and John Calvin appealed constantly to the Hebrew Bible to argue their case against the Catholic Church. They drew strong continuities between Israel's struggles with idolatry and what they saw as late medieval corruption. At the same time, they emphasized justification by faith and the inward work of the

Holy Spirit, themes that could be used to argue that visible membership in any institution, including ethnic Israel, was not what ultimately mattered.

Luther's trajectory is revealing. Early in his career, he expressed hope that his preaching of a purified gospel might win Jews to Christ. Later, frustrated and embittered, he wrote harsh and dangerous polemics against them. Calvin, by contrast, developed a more systematic covenant theology. He stressed that God's covenantal purposes run through Israel but culminate in Christ, and he read Paul's discussion of Israel in Romans as both a warning against arrogance and a promise that God's faithfulness to Israel would not finally be revoked. Yet even here, the future of Israel was framed more in terms of salvation than of political restoration. The focus was on the possibility of future Jewish conversion, not on the reestablishment of a Jewish kingdom in Palestine as a prophetic clock.

Within the broader Reformation world, there were millenarian currents that speculated about a coming age of peace, sometimes involving a mass turning of Jews to Christ. Some thinkers began to toy with the idea that such a conversion might be linked to a return to the land. But these remained minority views, and they did not crystallize into a detailed, popularized system. The mainstream assumption in both Protestant and Catholic theology was still that the Church, not a particular nation-state, was the primary locus of God's visible people, and that the land of Israel was significant mainly as a site of memory and symbol.

2.3 Early American Protestant attitudes toward Jews and Palestine

When European Protestants crossed the Atlantic, they brought this theological inheritance with them and reworked it in a new setting. Many in the Puritan and later evangelical traditions saw themselves as a kind of "new Israel" called to establish a godly commonwealth in a promised land. Biblical language about covenants, blessings, and curses was freely applied to the colonies and then to the young United States. The exodus story, in particular, became a template for imagining the American project: leaving the Old World's "Egypt," crossing the "sea" of the Atlantic, and settling in a land understood as providentially granted.

In this imaginative framework, the actual Jewish people were often absent or marginal. They were present in Scripture and in occasional local communities, but they did not stand at the center of American Protestant hopes. When they did appear, it was usually in missionary discourse: societies were formed to evangelize Jews, literature was written appealing for their conversion, and some preachers interpreted future Jewish belief in Christ as an important stage in God's purposes. Yet, again, this was more about salvation than geopolitics. The land of Palestine was mostly a distant biblical backdrop.

During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a handful of American and British Protestants began to entertain more specific ideas about Jewish restoration to the land. Some

argued that God's promises to Abraham and his descendants implied a future return. Others linked such a return to end-time scenarios. But these speculations remained relatively elite and scattered. They did not yet amount to a mass movement, and they did not decisively shape American foreign policy, which had little direct involvement with the Ottoman-controlled Holy Land.

Thus, on the eve of the Darby–Scofield revolution, the dominant patterns were still in place. Israel was primarily a theological category fulfilled in the Church. Jews were a people whose future was imagined in terms of possible conversion, not national sovereignty. The land of Israel was holy ground and a site for pilgrims, but not the central axis of an eschatological geopolitical timetable. It is against this background that Darby's system, with its sharp distinction between Israel and the Church and its insistence on a future national restoration in the land as an essential step in God's prophetic plan, represents a significant departure.

3. John Nelson Darby and the Invention of Dispensational Time

The shift from older Christian views of Israel to the Darby–Scofield system did not happen by accident. It was driven in large part by one determined, highly systematic mind: John Nelson Darby. His work did not merely add a few new opinions about prophecy. It reorganized the timeline of reality itself for his followers, carving up history into discrete “dispensations,” sharply distinguishing Israel from the Church, and inserting a secret “rapture” of believers before a climactic period of tribulation. Where earlier Christians had seen a more continuous story from Israel to Christ to the Church, Darby introduced a layered, segmented, almost mechanical view of God's dealings with humanity. Within that scheme, the Holy Land and a future restored Israel moved from background symbol to essential node in a predictive timetable. In this sense, Darby did not just teach new doctrines; he invented a new way of inhabiting time.

3.1 Darby's biography and ecclesial context

John Nelson Darby was trained as an Anglican clergyman in Ireland in the early nineteenth century. Educated, intellectually gifted, and initially loyal to the established Church, he soon became disillusioned with what he perceived as its compromise and worldliness. His dissatisfaction was not merely doctrinal; it was also ecclesial and spiritual. He wanted a purer, more immediate expression of New Testament Christianity, free from state control and formal hierarchy.

This search drew him into what would become the Plymouth Brethren movement, a loose network of believers who emphasized the authority of Scripture, the simplicity of worship, and the imminent return of Christ. The Brethren context provided Darby with both an audience and a lab space. Here he could experiment with new readings of prophecy, ecclesiology, and history

outside the boundaries of traditional church structures. His itinerant ministry, extensive writing, and personal charisma helped spread his ideas well beyond Ireland and England.

Darby's context was marked by social upheaval and religious ferment. Revolutionary aftershocks, industrialization, and the decline of old political orders created a pervasive sense that history was lurching toward a decisive crisis. Within this atmosphere, Darby's insistence that Scripture contained a detailed, divinely authored blueprint of the ages resonated deeply. He offered not only comfort, but an ordered map of chaos. That map would come to revolve around a strict distinction between Israel and the Church and a re-reading of the prophetic books through that lens.

3.2 Dispensations, rapture, and the Israel–Church divide

At the heart of Darby's system was the concept of “dispensations”: distinct periods in which God tested humanity in different ways, with different arrangements and responsibilities. While he could vary in how he enumerated them, the basic idea was that history is not a smooth continuum but a series of divinely defined regimes. Each dispensation has its own rules, its own promises, and its own failures. This framework allowed Darby to explain apparent tensions between different parts of Scripture by assigning them to different dispensational settings.

Within this schema, Darby drew a sharp line between Israel and the Church. Israel, for him, is an earthly people with earthly promises, centered on land, nationhood, and visible kingdom. The Church is a heavenly people, composed of all true believers, with a heavenly destiny. Crucially, he argued that the present age is a kind of parenthesis in God's dealings with Israel. The prophetic clock for Israel stopped, as it were, at the rejection of Christ. The Church age is inserted, and only when the Church is removed will God resume his direct dealings with Israel as a nation.

This is where the doctrine of the secret, pre-tribulation rapture comes in. Darby taught that Christ would come in two stages: first, invisibly, to snatch away the Church before a period of intense tribulation; then, visibly, to establish his kingdom. By extracting the Church from the world before the final troubles, Darby preserved the distinctiveness of Israel's prophetic destiny. The tribulation and the events surrounding it are primarily about Israel and the nations, not the Church. This made Israel's future restoration not just an interesting detail, but the central plot of the climactic dispensation.

3.3 Prophetic charts and the imagination of history

Darby's system lent itself almost naturally to visual representation. If history is divided into discrete dispensations, and if specific prophetic texts correspond to specific future events, then it becomes possible to draw the plan. Darby and his followers produced charts mapping out the

ages, the rapture, the tribulation, the return of Christ, the millennium, and the final judgment. These were not mere teaching aids; they were tools for inhabiting time.

Such charts collapsed vast stretches of biblical text and speculative chronology into a single glance. A believer could look at the diagram and see where “we” are now, what must happen next, and how contemporary events might fit into the sequence. Wars, famines, earthquakes, rising or falling empires—all could be read in relation to known waypoints on the prophetic map. The result was a powerful fusion of faith and forecast, in which theology and geopolitical interpretation formed a single cognitive package.

This way of imagining history had deep psychological effects. It created a strong sense of urgency: the rapture could occur at any moment, and the tribulation could be just around the corner. It also provided a sense of mastery over chaos: even if events seemed turbulent, they were part of a known sequence. For many, it offered both comfort and excitement. But it also introduced a new habit of mind: to think of Israel, the nations, and the land of Palestine primarily as pieces on a prophetic timeline, rather than as communities and places with complex internal histories.

3.4 How Darby’s system repositions the Holy Land

Within older Christian frameworks, the Holy Land was a place of memory, pilgrimage, and symbol. It mattered deeply as the setting of biblical events, but it did not necessarily have to reemerge as a Jewish nation-state for God’s plan to be fulfilled. Darby’s system changed that. By insisting on a strict separation between Israel and the Church and interpreting prophetic promises about land and kingdom in a literal, future-oriented way, he made a restored Israel in Palestine into a theological necessity.

In his reading, the promises to Abraham and his descendants about the land were not absorbed into a purely spiritual fulfillment in the Church. They remained specific and territorial. The prophetic books that speak of Israel’s future restoration, national repentance, and renewed dwelling in the land were assigned to a coming dispensation after the Church is removed. The Holy Land thus ceased to be primarily a symbol and became a forecasted geopolitical site. History could not reach its final dispensation without a Jewish presence, and eventually a Jewish state, in that particular territory.

This repositioning had far-reaching implications. It meant that developments in Palestine—Jewish migration, political movements, imperial policies—could be read as direct steps in God’s timetable. The land itself became a kind of eschatological barometer. For believers shaped by Darby’s framework, one could not think about the end times without thinking concretely about that strip of earth. The Holy Land was now not only “where it all happened” but “where it all must happen again.”

In this way, Darby's invention of dispensational time did more than reframe Bible reading. It rewired the imagination of millions of Christians such that Israel and the land of Palestine would eventually occupy the center of their expectations about God's unfolding plan. This is the theological architecture that later figures would popularize and translate into mass-market form, setting the stage for the fusion of American power and the modern State of Israel.

4. The Scofield Reference Bible as Theological Software Update

If John Nelson Darby wrote the code of dispensationalism, Cyrus Ingerson Scofield turned it into an operating system that ordinary people actually installed. The Scofield Reference Bible did something radically simple and therefore radically powerful: it placed a fully worked-out dispensational scheme directly into the margins and cross-references of an English Bible, so that readers encountered Darby's system at the exact moment they were encountering the biblical text. This fusion of Scripture and commentary acted as a theological software update for large swaths of American Protestantism, silently reconfiguring how millions of believers read Israel, the Church, and the Holy Land.

Unlike specialized prophetic charts or doctrinal treatises, the Scofield Bible did not ask laypeople to seek out an additional resource. It met them in the one book they already trusted above all others. The result was a slow but massive migration in imagination: those who adopted the Scofield Bible often came to experience dispensationalism not as one option among many, but as the obvious way the Bible itself speaks.

4.1 C. I. Scofield and his collaborators

C. I. Scofield began life far from the center of theological respectability. A Civil War veteran, lawyer, and convert to evangelical Protestantism, he had a complicated early career that included political connections and personal controversy. What he brought into his later ministry, however, was a keen sense of the power of printed materials and a knack for systematization. Converted in a milieu already influenced by dispensational teachers, he became convinced that this approach to Scripture could bring order and clarity to confused believers.

Scofield did not work alone. He gathered around him a network of scholars, pastors, and editors who shared his commitment to the dispensational scheme. Together, they undertook the ambitious project of producing a full Bible in which the text would be accompanied by explanatory notes, cross-references, and headings reflecting their doctrinal convictions. Their aim was not merely to publish another study Bible, but to embed an entire eschatological and ecclesiological system into the reading experience itself.

The first edition of the Scofield Reference Bible appeared in the early twentieth century. Its arrival coincided with rising tensions between modernist and fundamentalist currents within American Protestantism. Scofield and his circle presented their Bible as a tool for those who wanted to remain faithful to an inerrant Scripture and to a conservative theological outlook in an age of doubt. That positioning made it particularly attractive to pastors and laypeople seeking firm ground in a rapidly changing intellectual and cultural environment.

4.2 Notes in the margins: how commentary fused with Scripture

The genius—and danger—of the Scofield Reference Bible lies in its layout. For most readers, the visual hierarchy of a page communicates authority as much as the content itself. In Scofield's design, the biblical text and the commentary notes appear together on the same page, often separated only by a thin rule or set in slightly different type. Headings and cross-references guide the reader through the text along paths predetermined by the dispensational framework.

Over time, this arrangement produces a subtle but powerful fusion. For many owners, the Scofield Bible is not experienced as "Scripture plus Scofield's opinions," but as one unified object: "my Bible." The marginal notes become part of the way the text is known. Distinctions between what the text says and what the notes say blur, especially for readers who have little exposure to alternative commentaries. When a note explicitly labels a passage as referring to national Israel in a future dispensation, or identifies a particular verse as pointing to the rapture, that interpretation becomes the default setting in the reader's mind.

The cross-reference system reinforces this fusion. Verses that fit the dispensational grid are linked together, creating a web of connections that continually directs attention back to themes of Israel, prophecy, and the end times. Other possible connections—ethical, liturgical, sacramental, or historical—are less emphasized or absent. The result is a kind of theological auto-complete: when readers encounter certain phrases or images, the Scofield-provided meaning snaps into place before other readings have a chance to occur.

In this sense, the Scofield Bible functions like a software update silently installed on a device. It rewrites the underlying logic of how the biblical text is parsed, even when users continue to think of themselves as simply "reading the Bible."

4.3 Mass adoption in U.S. fundamentalism and evangelicalism

The Scofield Reference Bible did not remain a niche product. It was aggressively distributed, promoted at prophecy conferences, sold through Christian bookstores, and recommended from pulpits. Bible institutes and emerging fundamentalist seminaries adopted it as a standard text. In many contexts, young ministers learned to preach directly from Scofield's apparatus, internalizing both its wording and its structure.

Several factors helped drive its mass adoption. First, it arrived at a time when many Protestants were anxious about higher criticism, liberal theology, and the perceived erosion of biblical authority. Scofield's Bible presented itself as a solid, conservative alternative that took Scripture with utmost seriousness. Second, it supplied a comprehensive interpretive framework. Instead of piecemeal sermons, it offered a sense of the whole story: from creation to consummation, every passage had a place in the dispensational chart. Third, it was user-friendly. One did not need advanced theological training to follow the notes. The system came pre-packaged, clearly labeled, and immediately applicable.

As the twentieth century progressed, the Scofield Bible became almost synonymous with "serious Bible study" in many fundamentalist and evangelical circles. Families passed copies down through generations. Pastors quoted Scofield's headings or notes from memory. Prophecy teachers used its structure as the backbone for elaborate end-times lectures. By mid-century, millions of Americans had absorbed dispensationalism not through direct study of Darby or formal theological education, but through everyday devotions in a Scofield-marked text.

This mass adoption meant that entire congregations, denominations, and networks now shared a common eschatological imagination. They could talk about the rapture, the tribulation, the restoration of Israel, and the prophetic role of the nations with a shared vocabulary and assumed framework. It also meant that when geopolitical events touched on the Middle East, Scofield-formed believers were primed to interpret them through that lens.

4.4 "Bless Israel or be cursed": crystallizing a political theology

Within the Scofield framework, the biblical promise to Abraham—"I will bless those who bless you, and him who dishonors you I will curse"—takes on a new and intense significance. Scofield's notes and the broader dispensational tradition interpret this promise not primarily as fulfilled in Christ and extended to all nations, but as retaining a direct, ongoing application to the Jewish people and, eventually, to the modern State of Israel. The result is a powerful political theology in miniature: nations' fortunes rise or fall according to how they treat Israel.

This reading crystallizes in a simple, memorable formula often paraphrased as "bless Israel or be cursed." For believers taught through Scofield's lens, this is not a vague spiritual principle. It becomes a diagnostic for foreign policy. If America wants God's favor, it must support Israel; if it turns against Israel, it risks divine judgment. This conviction can coexist with strategic and moral arguments, but it also operates independently of them. Even if policy analysts or diplomats propose alternative approaches, the underlying fear of falling on the wrong side of God's promise exerts a constraining force.

Scofield's role here is not merely lexical; it is structural. By consistently distinguishing Israel from the Church, linking prophetic passages to a future national restoration, and highlighting texts

that can be read as conditional blessings on those who aid God's chosen people, his Bible trains readers to see support for Israel as a religious obligation. Over time, this disposition migrates from the private sphere into the public. Pastors preach it, lay leaders advocate it, voters carry it into the polling booth.

When later political movements and lobby organizations arose to translate this sentiment into concrete policy advocacy, they found a ready-made constituency already primed by decades of Scofield-shaped reading. The theological software of "bless Israel or be cursed" had been quietly updating minds for generations. What remained was to connect those minds to candidates, platforms, and legislative agendas. In that sense, the Scofield Reference Bible did not directly legislate American foreign policy, but it did something just as consequential: it formed the electorate and leadership class that would see unwavering support for Israel not as one option among many, but as a divinely mandated imperative.

5. From Pews to Policy: The Rise of American Christian Zionism

By the time the Scofield Reference Bible had done its quiet work, the conditions were in place for something new: a movement that would carry dispensational ideas out of the study and the prayer meeting and into the realm of politics and foreign policy. This did not happen all at once, nor did it follow a centrally planned script. Instead, it emerged through a series of overlapping developments: Bible conferences where prophecy was expounded to eager audiences; radio preachers who turned end-times speculation into a mass broadcast genre; networks of pastors and lay leaders who began to see events in Palestine as direct fulfillments of their charts; and donors and activists who discovered that their theological convictions could be translated into letters, votes, and eventually institutionalized lobbying.

What we now call American Christian Zionism was not simply "invented" by a single figure. It crystallized at the junction of a particular theology with new media and new crises. The same currents that produced fundamentalism, televangelism, and a distinct evangelical subculture also produced a religiously charged orientation toward the Jewish people and the land of Israel. For many participants, this orientation began as devotion and fascination: study tours to the Holy Land, maps on church walls, special offerings for missionary work among Jews. Over time, however, it gradually took on a more directly political form. By the mid-twentieth century, the stage was set for a grassroots constituency that would treat support for a Jewish state in Palestine as both a religious duty and a litmus test for political leaders.

5.1 Bible conferences, radio preachers, and prophecy culture

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the rise of a new kind of evangelical gathering: the Bible and prophecy conference. Held at resorts, campgrounds, and urban

auditoriums, these events brought together pastors, laypeople, and itinerant teachers for multi-day immersion in Scripture. Dispensationalism found in this format an ideal vehicle. Prophecy lecturers could lay out their charts, walk audiences through Daniel and Revelation, and connect distant texts into a single, thrilling narrative.

These conferences had several important features. They were often interdenominational, drawing attendees from various churches who shared a commitment to biblical inerrancy and a concern about modernism. They featured printed materials that attendees took home, including pamphlets, study guides, and recommendations for Bibles and commentaries, among which Scofield's edition loomed large. And they fostered a sense of insider knowledge: participants felt that they were being initiated into a deeper understanding of God's plan than what ordinary Sunday sermons provided.

Radio multiplied this effect. As Christian broadcasting expanded, preachers with a dispensational bent found in the airwaves a way to turn localized prophecy teaching into a national, even international, phenomenon. Daily or weekly programs could walk listeners through the same charts, now punctuated by references to current events. Wars, economic crises, political changes in Europe, and stirrings in the Middle East could all be woven into a running commentary on the approach of the end times.

Over time, this created a prophecy culture. Books on biblical prophecy became bestsellers in evangelical circles. Pastors integrated end-times themes into their preaching calendars. Youth groups watched films dramatizing the rapture and tribulation. The combined effect was to normalize a worldview in which history was constantly read through the lens of impending fulfillment, and in which the fate of Jews and of the land of Israel occupied a prominent place.

5.2 The Great Depression, World War II, and apocalyptic acceleration

Economic catastrophe and global war gave prophecy culture a darker, more urgent tone. The Great Depression shattered confidence in steady progress and raised the question of where God was in a world of unemployment, hunger, and political extremism. For many dispensational teachers, this was not a time for abstract theology but for decoding. The collapse of markets and the rise of authoritarian regimes were interpreted as harbingers of the prophesied final crisis. Listeners and readers were told that the biblical warnings about famines, pestilences, and "distress of nations" were unfolding in real time.

World War II intensified this sense of apocalyptic acceleration. The rise of fascism, the mechanization of war, and the sheer scale of destruction seemed to match prophetic images of beasts and kingdoms drunk with blood. The horror of the Holocaust, once its dimensions became known, had a particularly deep impact. For many Christians shaped by dispensational interpretations, the attempted annihilation of European Jewry was not only a moral outrage but

a sign that the Jewish people stood at the center of a cosmic struggle. Some saw in it an attempt by satanic forces to thwart God's promises to Israel.

At the same time, the war reshaped the geopolitical map, weakening old empires and opening the way for new arrangements in colonial territories, including Palestine. British policy shifts and Zionist efforts toward establishing a Jewish homeland in the land of the Bible were closely watched by prophecy teachers. When they reported to their audiences that Jews were returning to the land in significant numbers, or that political moves toward a Jewish state were underway, they did so with a sense of prophetic awe. These developments were not random; they were the visible outworking of texts that had long been studied and charted.

The effect of these combined crises was to confirm, in the minds of many believers, that their interpretive framework was correct and that history was racing toward its appointed climax. This sense of confirmation would make the events of 1948 and the recognition of Israel by the United States feel not like a contingent political decision, but like the expected next step in a divinely scripted drama.

5.3 Networks of pastors, donors, and laypeople oriented to Israel

While world events and media amplified prophecy culture, the everyday work of building networks took place in local churches, Bible colleges, mission agencies, and informal associations. Pastors who had been formed by Scofield and prophecy conferences gradually brought their congregations into an Israel-oriented worldview. They organized special services focusing on biblical prophecy. They invited guest speakers who had traveled to Palestine. They put maps and photographs on bulletin boards, highlighting Jewish settlements and archaeological sites.

Mission organizations discovered that raising funds for work "among the Jews" resonated powerfully with donors whose theology placed Israel at the center of God's end-time purposes. Appeals emphasized both compassion and prophecy: helping Jewish people materially and spiritually was framed as participating in God's unfolding plan. Over time, these efforts morphed from purely evangelistic endeavors into more complex partnerships that included humanitarian relief, support for Jewish immigration to Palestine, and later, after 1948, direct aid to the new state.

Laypeople, too, became part of an informal network. They subscribed to prophecy newsletters, attended conferences, and shared pamphlets with friends and family. Some began to travel to the Holy Land themselves, joining organized tours that combined tourism, biblical study, and political orientation. Such trips often included meetings with Israeli officials or military officers, reinforcing the sense that Israel's modern story was tightly bound to the biblical narrative and to the believer's own spiritual identity.

These networks created a feedback loop. The more pastors and lay leaders oriented their spiritual lives toward Israel and its future, the more natural it became to see events there as a central concern, not only theologically but practically. Prayer lists featured Israel regularly. Church bulletins carried updates on Middle Eastern events. When political debates later arose about how the United States should respond to crises in the region, a significant segment of the population was already primed to view “what is good for Israel” as a direct extension of what is good for God’s purposes.

5.4 Christian Zionism as a grassroots foreign-policy lobby in waiting

By the middle of the twentieth century, long before the term “Christian Zionism” became common in public discourse, the elements of a grassroots foreign-policy lobby were in place. Millions of Americans had been taught, in their churches and through their media, that Israel’s restoration was central to God’s plan and that nations would be judged by their treatment of the Jewish people. They had developed emotional and spiritual attachments to the land and to the idea of a Jewish state. They were accustomed to praying for Israel, giving money to causes connected to Israel, and interpreting news from the region as signs of prophetic fulfillment.

What remained was to connect this religiously formed constituency to the mechanisms of political power. That connection did not happen overnight. It involved the gradual recognition, by political operatives and by evangelical leaders themselves, that the beliefs of these communities could be translated into voting patterns, campaign issues, and organized advocacy. Pastors began to encourage congregants to consider a candidate’s stance on Israel as a criterion for support. Activists formed committees and organizations dedicated specifically to strengthening U.S.–Israel ties. Conferences that had once focused mostly on prophecy and Bible study now added sessions on public policy, urging attendees to contact their representatives and support pro-Israel legislation.

In this phase, Christian Zionism ceased to be merely an interpretive lens and became an organized force. Its power lay less in elite theological argument than in sheer numbers and passion. Politicians learned that taking a strong pro-Israel stance could mobilize donors and voters within key districts, especially in regions where evangelical Protestants were a significant portion of the electorate. Conversely, waffling or criticizing Israeli policies could provoke backlash from same.

Thus, by the time Truman faced the question of recognizing the State of Israel, and even more so in subsequent decades, a large part of the American religious public was ready-made to support such moves. They did not need to be persuaded from scratch; their imaginations had long been trained in a direction that made alignment with Israel not just permissible but spiritually obvious. In that sense, American Christian Zionism functioned as a grassroots foreign-

policy lobby in waiting, prepared by decades of theological software and cultural reinforcement to welcome and defend the fusion that this paper calls the United States of Israel.

6. Truman at the Crossroads: Recognition as Subconscious Anchor

When the State of Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948, Harry S. Truman was not thinking in terms of dispensational charts or Scofield notes. He was, however, a man whose imagination had been deeply shaped by the Bible since childhood, and who now sat at the hinge point where that scriptural world intersected with the raw pressures of postwar geopolitics. His signature on the short statement recognizing the new state, issued just eleven minutes after the declaration in Tel Aviv, was the visible act by which the United States stepped into a new kind of commitment.

From the perspective of this paper, that moment functions as what might be called a subconscious anchor. It did not create American Christian Zionism, but it gave it a presidential seal. It did not fully determine subsequent policy, but it set a default that later leaders would find hard to reverse. Truman's decision was forged amid fierce internal debate, conflicting memoranda, and serious strategic doubts, yet once made, it was remembered and retold in biblical language. In later years he would compare himself to Cyrus, the Persian king who allowed the exiles to return and rebuild. That self-understanding, whatever its complexities, illuminates how deeply the categories of Israel, land, and promise had penetrated even the ostensibly secular office of the American presidency. [BYU Studies+2Christian History Institute+2](#)

6.1 Truman's religious upbringing and view of the Bible

Harry Truman grew up in a world where the Bible was not an occasional reference book but a constant companion. Raised in a Baptist milieu on the Missouri frontier, he absorbed Scripture through family reading, Sunday school, and congregational life. As a young man he formally joined a Baptist church, was baptized, and maintained membership in Baptist congregations even as he later attended other churches with his wife. [Christian History Institute+2Providence Journal+2](#)

For Truman, the King James Version was not just one translation among many; it was "the Bible as it should be," a text whose cadences and stories were woven into his memory. He read it frequently and quoted it easily in conversation and correspondence. Staff and observers later recalled that he would sometimes reach for specific passages when thinking about political questions, including issues related to the land of Israel. One State Department official complained that the president "constantly pointed" to the biblical injunction in Deuteronomy that commands Israel to go in and possess the land, and Truman himself later embraced the

comparison to Cyrus when speaking about his role in the creation of the state. [Christian History Institute+2Religion Unplugged+2](#)

It would be misleading to call Truman a dispensationalist in the technical sense. He did not preach about the rapture or expound prophetic charts. His faith was more in the mold of an earnest, Bible-reading layman who took Scripture seriously as a moral and historical guide. Yet this is precisely what makes his case important for the argument of this paper. The same Bible-saturated culture that had produced Darby's followers and Scofield's readers also formed Truman's imagination. When he encountered Jewish claims to the land of Palestine, he did so not as a neutral manager of power, but as someone for whom the stories of Abraham, Moses, and the exiles were deeply familiar and emotionally resonant.

6.2 1947–1948: partition debates, Holocaust memory, and domestic pressures

The decision to recognize Israel did not emerge in a vacuum. In the years immediately following World War II, the question of Palestine was one of the most contentious issues facing the Truman administration. Britain, exhausted and facing violent conflict in the mandate territory, announced its intention to withdraw. The United Nations took up the problem and, in November 1947, approved a partition plan that envisioned separate Jewish and Arab states with an internationalized Jerusalem. [Wikipedia+2CORE+2](#)

Within the U.S. government, there was no consensus about how to respond. The State Department, led by Secretary of State George Marshall and supported by officials like Loy Henderson, warned against endorsing partition or a Jewish state. They feared that such a move would alienate Arab governments, destabilize the region, and jeopardize American access to Middle Eastern oil. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued memoranda arguing that partition could open the door to Soviet influence and entangle the United States in conflicts far from home. [Jewish Virtual Library+3Jewish Voice for Peace+3Office of the Historian+3](#)

At the same time, Truman faced intense domestic pressure. Jewish organizations and leaders, some of whom had long-standing relationships with him, lobbied vigorously for U.S. support of a Jewish state. The moral shock of the Holocaust made the plight of Jewish refugees an urgent humanitarian issue, and advocates framed the establishment of a homeland as both a matter of justice and a fulfillment of historic aspirations. Truman's mailbag filled with tens of thousands of letters and telegrams urging him to back partition and, later, recognition of the new state. He was acutely aware of these pressures, and although he bristled at the suggestion that mere politics guided his choices, he could not ignore the mobilized sentiment. [JCPA+3Jewish Voice for Peace+3OhioLINK ETD Center+3](#)

Holocaust memory added a distinct moral weight. For many Americans, including the president, the revelation of the death camps and the scale of Nazi atrocities created a sense that

something extraordinary was owed to the surviving Jews. Truman's own statements and later reflections indicate that he saw the question of Palestine partly through this lens of postwar conscience. The horror of what had happened in Europe made it harder to treat Jewish claims as just one more ethnic demand in a complex colonial dispute. In this environment, theological sympathies, humanitarian concerns, and strategic worries collided.

6.3 The eleven-minute recognition: motives, conflicts, and myths

As the British mandate neared its end and Zionist leaders prepared to declare independence, the internal struggle within the Truman administration intensified. Some advisers urged immediate recognition of the new Jewish state, arguing that it was the only realistic and moral course. Others recommended a trusteeship arrangement or delay, fearing that precipitous recognition would inflame the region and burden the United States with responsibility for outcomes it could not control. [Harry S. Truman Presidential Library+2WRMEA+2](#)

Truman's most famous internal clash on this issue was with Marshall. According to multiple accounts, Marshall believed that recognizing a Jewish state against State Department advice would be reckless and might even lead him to resign. In a tense White House meeting in May 1948, Marshall and other officials argued their case, while domestic political advisers and pro-Zionist figures pressed the opposite view. Truman listened, weighed, and ultimately chose to move quickly toward recognition, over the strong objections of some of his closest foreign policy professionals. [britainpalestineproject.org+2The Washington Institute+2](#)

On May 14, 1948, only minutes after the Jewish leadership in Tel Aviv proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel, the White House released a brief statement recognizing the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new state. The timing—eleven minutes after the declaration—became part of the story, signaling both eagerness and decisiveness. [Harry S. Truman Presidential Library+2National Archives+2](#)

Interpreting Truman's motives has been a matter of ongoing debate. Some emphasize domestic politics: the importance of Jewish voters and donors, and the president's vulnerability heading into the 1948 election. Others highlight moral and humanitarian factors, noting his repeated references to the suffering of European Jews and his irritation at the suggestion that he was acting cynically. Still others argue that his decision reflected a judgment that a Jewish state was now an unavoidable fact on the ground and that U.S. interests would be better served by early engagement than by hostility or distance. Truman himself insisted that he was guided by conscience and by America's values, not by narrowly sectarian pressure. [edharperlaw.com+3JCPA+3The Washington Institute+3](#)

Beneath these debated motives, however, lay a deeper narrative layer. In later years, when Truman accepted the "Cyrus" comparison and explicitly linked his recognition of Israel to a

biblical pattern of restoration, he effectively retrofitted his political act with theological meaning. That move did not erase the complexity of the original decision, but it shaped how it would be remembered, especially by those already inclined to see the modern state as a fulfillment of prophecy. [Christian History Institute+2Religion Dispatches+2](#)

6.4 Anchoring effect: how one decision welded U.S. identity to Israel

Whatever Truman's precise mix of motives, the effect of his decision was to weld American identity and Israeli statehood together in a new way. Before 1948, American Protestants could speculate about a future restoration of Israel and read events in Palestine through their prophetic grids, but there was no formal political covenant. After the eleven-minute recognition, the world's emerging superpower was on record as the first state to welcome Israel into the community of nations. That symbolic precedence mattered. It turned theological sympathy into diplomatic fact. [Harry S. Truman Presidential Library+2National Archives+2](#)

In the years that followed, the relationship would deepen through arms sales, diplomatic support, and shared strategic interests, especially as the Cold War framed Israel as a Western-aligned outpost in a contested region. Yet the moral and narrative baseline had already been set. Supporters of Israel in the United States could point back to Truman's act as the founding gesture of a special bond. Israelis could remember the American president as the first head of state to recognize their sovereignty. The story of U.S.–Israel relations thus began with an origin myth that fused political calculation with biblical overtones. [The Washington Institute+2Scholars Crossing+2](#)

For American Christians formed by dispensational and Scofield-influenced readings, Truman's recognition functioned as external confirmation of their internal maps. A president steeped in the Bible had, perhaps unconsciously, aligned national policy with what they believed to be God's prophetic timetable. Even if Truman himself did not share their detailed eschatology, his language and later self-understanding reinforced the perception that the United States had stepped into a role analogous to that of ancient Persia in the days of Cyrus: the gentile power chosen to facilitate Israel's return and restoration.

This perception created a powerful anchor in both theology and politics. Future presidents could adjust attitudes and tactics, but outright reversal of the basic commitment to Israel became almost unthinkable. Members of Congress, voters, and church leaders came to treat support for Israel as part of American identity, not just a policy option. The United States of America and the State of Israel were no longer simply two actors whose interests sometimes overlapped. In the minds of millions, they were joined in a story that began in Scripture, passed through Truman's desk, and continued into every subsequent debate about war, peace, and

justice in the Middle East. That is the anchoring effect this paper names as the birth of the United States of Israel.

7. Cold War Fusion: Israel as Outpost and “Little America”

Once the State of Israel was recognized, the relationship between Washington and Jerusalem did not automatically leap to the level of fusion this paper calls the United States of Israel. The early years were hesitant and ambivalent. U.S. officials oscillated between seeing Israel as a strategic liability that endangered access to Arab oil and as a potential asset in containing Soviet influence. Over the course of the Cold War, however, a combination of military performance, shared intelligence, and ideological framing steadily pushed the relationship toward fusion. By the 1970s and 1980s, Israel was widely described in American discourse as a “strategic asset,” sometimes even as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” or a “Little America” in the Middle East.

This gradual shift did not erase tensions or disagreements, but it relativized them. Strategic calculations that might have led to a more balanced posture toward Arab states were increasingly outweighed by a sense that Israel and the United States stood on the same side of a global struggle—militarily, politically, and morally. Cold War logics wrapped themselves around older theological ties, reinforcing the fusion that had begun with Truman’s signature.

7.1 Early strategic debates: liability, asset, or both?

In the 1950s, American policymakers were far from unanimous about Israel’s utility. On one side, the State Department and many career diplomats viewed close identification with Israel as a serious liability. Arab nationalism was surging, British and French influence were declining, and the United States was trying to present itself as an anti-colonial power friendly to newly independent states. In that context, Israel could easily be framed—as it often was by Arab leaders—as a Western implant or settler project imposed on the region. Aligning too closely with Israel risked driving Arab governments toward Moscow and endangering U.S. access to oil.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 crystallized some of these concerns. When Britain, France, and Israel launched a coordinated attack on Egypt after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, President Eisenhower responded not by supporting his traditional allies, but by pressuring them to withdraw. That episode is often remembered as a rare moment when the United States rebuked Israeli military action in strong terms and refused to underwrite it. At the time, it underscored the view that U.S. interests might be better served by maintaining some distance from Israeli initiatives and by courting key Arab states as partners in the containment of Soviet expansion.

On the other side, however, a different view was emerging. Some strategists saw in Israel a uniquely capable military actor whose very survival depended on defeating Soviet-armed

clients. From this perspective, Israeli victories over Arab armies would serve not only its own security but also the broader Western cause. Israel could be understood as a forward post in the global struggle with communism, a small but agile actor whose successes would signal the superiority of Western-trained forces and Western-supplied technology. The question in these early debates was whether Israel would destabilize the region beyond repair or whether its strength would ultimately stabilize it on terms favorable to the United States.

7.2 The 1967 and 1973 wars: military performance and shifting perceptions

The Six-Day War in 1967 dramatically shifted these perceptions. In less than a week, Israel defeated the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, seizing the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Golan Heights. For American observers, the war was a startling demonstration of Israeli military prowess. It showed that Israel could not only survive but also dominate in conventional warfare against numerically superior foes equipped with Soviet gear.

This performance strengthened the hand of those in Washington who argued that Israel was a valuable asset. A state that could so effectively neutralize Soviet-trained armies and capture Soviet equipment offered intelligence and tactical dividends. Israeli battlefields became laboratories where American analysts could study the performance of Soviet tanks, aircraft, and tactics under real combat conditions. The imagery of a small democracy standing off a ring of hostile regimes also resonated deeply with American narratives about courage, ingenuity, and the defense of freedom.

The Yom Kippur War in 1973 complicated the picture. Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel during a major Jewish holy day, achieving significant initial gains. The war quickly escalated into a crisis that drew in both superpowers. The United States organized a massive airlift of military supplies to Israel, while the Soviet Union resupplied Arab forces. Nuclear alert levels were raised. At the same time, Arab oil producers imposed an embargo in response to U.S. support for Israel, triggering a global energy crisis.

From a narrow strategic vantage point, the 1973 war exposed both the risks and the depth of the emerging fusion. It showed that the United States would not allow Israel to be defeated and was willing to bear economic and diplomatic costs to ensure its survival. It also showed how support for Israel could provoke wider blowback affecting the entire Western economy. Yet in the long run, the war reinforced the perception that U.S. and Israeli fates were linked. The crisis led to intensified American diplomatic engagement in Arab–Israeli negotiations and to a more formalized security relationship. What had been an improvised airlift began to solidify into a permanent security umbilical cord.

7.3 Aid, arms, and intelligence: building the security umbilical cord

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the United States and Israel constructed an elaborate network of aid, arms transfers, and intelligence cooperation that made their militaries deeply interdependent. U.S. economic and military assistance to Israel, which had been significant but limited in earlier years, grew into a consistent and large-scale flow. Israel became one of the primary recipients of American foreign aid, with substantial portions earmarked for the purchase of U.S.-made weaponry.

Advanced aircraft, tanks, and electronic systems flowed to Israel under arrangements that emphasized its “qualitative military edge” over neighboring states. American-made fighters were modified by Israeli engineers, sometimes feeding design lessons back into U.S. defense thinking. Joint development projects, such as early missile defense efforts, further bound the two defense establishments together. American forces benefited from Israeli combat experience and from access to captured Soviet equipment; Israeli forces benefited from cutting-edge U.S. technology and from a reliable resupply pipeline in times of crisis.

Intelligence cooperation added another layer. Israel’s proximity to Soviet clients and contested zones made it a valuable listening post. Its intelligence services collected information on Soviet equipment, advisors, and regional politics that was of keen interest to Washington. In return, U.S. agencies shared satellite imagery, signals intelligence, and analytical support. Over time, this exchange created habits of daily coordination that made the relationship feel less like a transactional alliance and more like a joint enterprise.

The security umbilical cord was not merely material. It generated institutional and personal ties: officers trained together, officials moved back and forth for consultations, and bureaucratic routines evolved around the expectation of constant collaboration. Even when disagreements arose over particular operations or policies, the underlying structure of mutual reliance remained intact.

7.4 The moralization of the alliance: democracy, Bible, and “shared values”

As strategic and security ties deepened, public discourse in the United States increasingly framed the relationship with Israel in moral and civilizational terms. Israel was commonly described as “the only democracy in the Middle East,” a phrase that condensed several claims: that Israel shared America’s commitment to elections, rule of law, and individual rights; that it stood apart from surrounding authoritarian regimes; and that this shared political culture justified a special bond.

For many American Christians, especially those influenced by dispensational and Scofield-shaped readings, these political arguments merged with older theological affinities. Israel was not only a formal democracy but also the land of the Bible, the site of sacred history, and the

home of a people whose story ran through their Scriptures and liturgy. “Shared values” thus encompassed more than institutional similarities. They invoked a “Judeo–Christian heritage” in which both nations appeared as heirs of the same moral and spiritual tradition.

This moralization of the alliance had several consequences. It made criticism of Israeli policies more difficult to articulate within mainstream American politics, because such criticism could be framed as an attack on someone “like us.” It also allowed strategic decisions to be wrapped in the language of friendship, loyalty, and even covenant. When U.S. officials spoke of an “unbreakable bond,” they were not simply describing interests; they were participating in a story in which breaking with Israel would be a kind of betrayal of family.

At the same time, this framing often glossed over or minimized realities that did not fit the narrative: the ongoing occupation of Palestinian territories, inequalities within Israeli society, and the complex roles of religion and nationalism in regional conflict. Within the United States, dissenting voices that tried to raise these issues frequently found themselves accused of undermining “shared values” or of failing to appreciate the biblical and historical significance of Israel.

By the late Cold War period, then, the fusion of strategic, theological, and moral narratives was largely complete. Israel was not only an outpost of Western power but a “Little America,” imagined as a miniature version of the United States in a hostile region: democratic, embattled, resolute, and central to a story that ran from the Bible through Truman’s desk to contemporary geopolitics. That fusion is what allows later developments—lobbying, congressional rhetoric, and popular mobilization—to operate not as a new departure but as the natural outgrowth of an already internalized identity: the United States of Israel.

8. U.S.I. as Political Theology in Practice

Up to this point, U.S.I. has been described largely in terms of genealogy: a theological software update, a presidential anchor, and a Cold War fusion. In practice, however, U.S.I. lives not only in doctrines or treaties but in rituals, phrases, travel itineraries, fundraising campaigns, and media frames. It is, in effect, a political theology: a way of attributing sacred meaning to political realities and of treating certain state relationships as expressions of divine will.

In this register, U.S.I. does not appear as a formal doctrine tucked away in academic theology. It functions as an unspoken liturgy that runs through civil religion, congressional rhetoric, evangelical life, and media narratives. Its authority is felt precisely because it is rarely named explicitly. What follows is an analysis of four of its most important practical arenas.

8.1 Civil religion and the sacralization of foreign policy

American civil religion is the informal set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals that give the nation a quasi-sacred identity: references to “one nation under God,” invocations of providence in inaugural addresses, and the framing of national wars as struggles for freedom and justice. Within this civil religion, Israel gradually occupies a privileged role. The biblical language that once applied primarily to the United States as a “city on a hill” or a “new Israel” increasingly expands to include, or even center upon, the actual State of Israel.

At the level of presidential rhetoric, this shows up in the pairing of the two nations in speeches: both are described as chosen, exceptional, rooted in Scripture, and tested by enemies. National days of prayer sometimes include explicit intercession for Israel’s security. Public ceremonies mark anniversaries of Israel’s founding, where American officials speak as though celebrating a family member’s birthday rather than a foreign state’s independence. In these moments, the boundary between patriotism and piety blurs, and foreign policy toward one particular country takes on a sacralized character.

This sacralization has a disciplining function. To question the shape of the U.S.–Israel relationship begins to feel, within civil religion, like questioning the nation’s relationship to God. It does not mean that all critics are silenced, but it moves the conversation out of the realm of ordinary policy dispute and into a zone where accusations of disloyalty, ingratitude, or irreligion can be mobilized. U.S.I. thus operates as a kind of unwritten article of the American civil creed.

8.2 Congressional rhetoric and the “unbreakable bond” formula

If civil religion provides the broad frame, congressional rhetoric supplies the repeated phrases that harden into a liturgy. In debates, resolutions, and public statements, members of Congress regularly describe the U.S.–Israel relationship as a “special relationship,” a “unique partnership,” and, most conspicuously, an “unbreakable bond.” The phrase “unbreakable bond” functions like a key line in a creed. It is recited across party lines, inserted into resolutions, and applauded on cue during high-profile speeches.

Such formulae do more than signal support. They pre-commit. To call a bond “unbreakable” is to rule out in advance the possibility that it could be significantly revised in response to future actions or circumstances. This stands in tension with normal democratic oversight of foreign policy, where alliances are at least theoretically subject to reassessment. In practice, congressional language about Israel tends to invert this: it is support, not scrutiny, that is treated as the default; scrutiny must justify itself against accusations of undermining the bond.

Other recurring elements supplement this formula. Congress repeatedly affirms Israel’s right to defend itself, often without parallel recognition of other parties’ rights to security. It passes resolutions recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, endorsing particular territorial claims, or

condemning international bodies perceived as critical of Israel. These acts are presented not only as strategic choices but as moral obligations. The language of “values,” “heritage,” and “friends who share our faith” moves debates about military aid or diplomatic backing into the realm of identity politics for the legislature itself.

Within this environment, U.S.I. is enacted whenever bipartisan standing ovations greet visiting Israeli leaders or symbolic resolutions pass by overwhelming margins. The cumulative effect is to normalize the idea that the United States and Israel speak with one voice, even when the subject is war, occupation, or contested legal questions.

8.3 Evangelical grassroots: tours, donations, and pilgrimage politics

At the popular level, U.S.I. is sustained and intensified by evangelical grassroots practices that combine piety, tourism, and political mobilization. Church groups organize tours to the Holy Land that are explicitly marketed as “Bible prophecy trips” or “journeys of solidarity.”

Participants walk in locations associated with Jesus and the apostles, but they also visit modern military installations, border fences, and settlements. Guides and speakers weave together biblical narratives and contemporary political arguments, encouraging visitors to interpret present-day conflicts as direct extensions of Scripture.

These tours are not neutral educational experiences. They function as immersive catechesis in U.S.I. political theology. Travelers return home with photos of themselves planting trees, praying at monuments, or meeting Israeli soldiers, all framed as participation in God’s ongoing restoration of Israel. Sermons and testimonies following these trips often reinforce a narrative in which supporting modern Israel is equated with loving the Bible and honoring God’s covenant.

Donations and sponsorships further concretize this orientation. Evangelical churches and ministries raise funds for a variety of Israel-related causes: humanitarian aid for Jewish immigrants, support for soldiers, assistance to communities in contested territories, and contributions to organizations that promote Jewish–Christian cooperation within a specific theological frame. These financial flows express not only charity but alignment. Giving becomes a way of voting with one’s wallet in favor of a particular reading of both Scripture and geopolitics.

Pilgrimage politics thus extend the reach of U.S.I. far beyond Washington. They cultivate affective bonds between ordinary American believers and Israeli institutions. They also create constituencies that will resist any perceived softening of U.S. policy toward Israel, as such softening would feel not only like a strategic change but like a betrayal of personal commitments and spiritual experiences.

8.4 Media, lobby groups, and the normalization of U.S.I. language

Finally, the language and assumptions of U.S.I. are diffused and stabilized through media ecosystems and organized lobbying. On one side, mainstream and partisan media outlets alike often narrate Middle Eastern events in ways that foreground Israeli perspectives and security concerns. Terminology choices—“terrorist” versus “militant,” “disputed territories” versus “occupied territories”—carry implicit judgments that align with official Israeli narratives. Cable news panels, talk radio hosts, and opinion columns frequently frame criticism of Israeli policy as naivety, bias, or even antisemitism, while presenting strong U.S. backing as common sense.

On the other side, specialized Christian media—television networks, publishing houses, online platforms—explicitly integrate prophecy teaching, Israel advocacy, and political messaging. Here, news stories from the region are routinely linked to biblical passages, and appeals for donations or activism are couched in apocalyptic language. Viewers and readers are given not only information but an interpretive script in which Israel’s fortunes and America’s obedience to God are tightly coupled.

Lobby groups operate at the interface of this media environment and formal politics. Secular and religious pro-Israel organizations educate legislators, organize conferences, and coordinate messaging campaigns. Evangelical-specific groups work to translate theological convictions into policy demands, often providing pastors and lay leaders with talking points, sample letters to representatives, and voter guides. In these materials, the vocabulary of “shared values,” “Judeo-Christian heritage,” and “standing with Israel” is constant.

Over time, this combination of media framing and organized lobbying normalizes U.S.I. language. Phrases like “our closest ally,” “our friends in Israel,” and “standing shoulder to shoulder” become so familiar that alternative framings—such as describing the relationship as an alliance subject to conditions—sound jarring or even hostile. The result is a public discourse in which the fusion of American and Israeli identities feels like an obvious baseline rather than a contested political theology.

In all these ways—civil religion, congressional rhetoric, evangelical grassroots practices, and media-lobby coordination—U.S.I. functions not as an abstract concept but as a lived system. It shapes how Americans imagine their place in the world, how they read their Scriptures, how they vote, and how they respond to conflict. The political theology that began as a particular theological innovation has become, through these practices, an operative creed that guides a superpower’s foreign policy as though it were a matter of faith.

9. Blind Spots and Costs of the U.S.I. Formation

Naming the U.S.–Israel fusion as U.S.I. is not merely a semantic exercise. It forces into view a set of blind spots and costs that are otherwise dispersed across policy memos, news cycles, and theological debates. The very features that make U.S.I. feel stable and morally compelling to its adherents—its sacralized bond, its prophetic backing, its Cold War pedigree—also restrict what can be questioned and what can change. Those restrictions carry concrete consequences: for U.S. diplomacy, for Palestinians living under occupation, for regional perceptions of American power, and for internal U.S. cohesion among Jews, Christians, and secular citizens.

This section does not claim that every cost is unique to the U.S.–Israel relationship, nor that every negative outcome can be laid solely at the feet of U.S.I. It does argue, however, that once a bilateral relationship has been elevated into a quasi-theological covenant, normal mechanisms of recalibration and correction are impaired. The result is a persistent misalignment between proclaimed American principles and actual practice, felt acutely in the Israeli–Palestinian arena and echoed across the wider Middle East.

9.1 Policy constraints: what Washington cannot say or do

Every alliance creates constraints. U.S.I. intensifies those constraints by encoding them in moral and theological language. In a conventional alliance, policymakers can at least in principle ask basic questions: under what conditions should aid be reduced, military cooperation limited, or diplomatic backing withheld? In the U.S.I. context, even posing such questions publicly can trigger accusations of betrayal or hostility toward the Jewish people, especially when religious arguments are in play.

One major constraint concerns conditionality. The United States routinely attaches conditions to aid and arms sales for other partners, citing human rights, democratic backsliding, or misuse of weaponry. In the case of Israel, proposals to do the same often meet a different kind of resistance. The issue is not merely strategic but symbolic: to condition aid is felt by many as an affront to the “unbreakable bond,” an implied withdrawal of blessing from a nation seen as central to God’s plan. As a result, policy tools that are used elsewhere as normal levers of influence are politically toxic here.

Another constraint lies in the realm of speech. High-ranking officials can criticize Israeli policies in carefully chosen words, but they operate within a narrow rhetorical corridor. To describe certain actions in terms commonly used elsewhere—occupation, discrimination, disproportionate force—can provoke intense backlash. Even when such terms appear in confidential analyses, they are often softened in public statements, replaced by euphemisms that obscure the underlying realities. Congressional hearings on U.S. policy toward Israel and

Palestine frequently feature a highly asymmetrical vocabulary: one side's suffering is personalized and moralized; the other's is abstracted or framed primarily as collateral.

These constraints do not mean that Washington has no agency, nor that internal disagreements vanish. They do mean that the range of what elected officials feel they can safely advocate before a mass audience is significantly narrower than their private assessments might be. U.S.I., as political theology, polices the boundaries of thinkable policy by attaching spiritual and identity costs to certain positions.

9.2 Palestine, international law, and the price of theological commitments

Nowhere are the costs of U.S.I. more visible than in the unresolved status of Palestine and the legal debates surrounding occupation, settlements, and human rights. Successive American administrations have articulated support for a negotiated two-state solution and for principles of international law. Yet in practice, U.S. policy has often shielded Israel from the full implications of those same legal frameworks, especially in international forums.

From the standpoint of international law, questions about the status of territory captured in war, the rights of occupied populations, and the legality of settlement construction are complex but not unprecedented. Similar issues arise in other regions, and the United States sometimes supports or at least tolerates robust legal scrutiny elsewhere. In the Israeli–Palestinian case, however, U.S. vetoes, diplomatic pressure, and rhetorical framing frequently work to blunt or delegitimize such scrutiny when it is applied to Israel. Legal processes are portrayed as biased, politicized, or inherently hostile, rather than as imperfect but necessary tools.

Theological commitments embedded in U.S.I. help explain this asymmetry. If large segments of the American political class and electorate believe that the land in question has been promised in perpetuity to the Jewish people, and that modern Israel's presence there is in some sense divinely mandated, then international legal claims appear at best negotiable, at worst impious. If narratives about blessing and curse are layered onto policy debates, concessions demanded by law can be reimagined as demands that Israel "divide the land" in ways that some interpret as inviting judgment.

The price of this theological overlay is paid most directly by Palestinians, whose claims to land, rights, and self-determination are often heard through a filter that treats them as secondary to a prior sacred story. It is also paid by American credibility when it invokes international norms elsewhere. The more visibly the United States makes an exception for one ally on theological or civil-religious grounds, the harder it becomes to persuade others that its appeals to law and human rights are principled rather than selective.

9.3 Blowback and perception in the wider Middle East

U.S.I. also shapes how American power is perceived across the wider Middle East and in parts of the Muslim-majority world beyond it. Many people in the region do not parse fine distinctions between American and Israeli policy; they see a single bloc. The more that U.S. leaders emphasize an unbreakable bond, shared destiny, and sacralized ties, the more plausible it becomes for critics to treat American actions as direct extensions of Israeli interests, and vice versa.

This perception feeds into multiple forms of blowback. At the diplomatic level, it complicates U.S. efforts to present itself as an honest broker in negotiations. Even when American envoys attempt to mediate disputes or broker ceasefires, their deep structural alignment with one party leads many regional actors to view their efforts as partial by design. This skepticism does not always block agreements, but it adds layers of distrust that make them more fragile.

At the societal level, U.S.I. becomes raw material for radicalization narratives. Extremist movements routinely frame the United States as a hostile power waging war on Muslims and Arabs, often citing its close relationship with Israel as Exhibit A. Propaganda materials rarely distinguish between theological Christian Zionists, secular strategists, or ordinary Americans; they present a monolithic image of a United States fused to Israel in an anti-Islamic project. While such narratives simplify and distort, they draw power from publicly visible symbols: military aid packages, diplomatic vetoes, and high-profile affirmations of unity.

There is also more subtle blowback affecting moderates. Intellectuals, activists, and ordinary citizens in the region who might otherwise see value in closer engagement with the United States can become disillusioned when they observe that American empathy and outrage appear unevenly distributed. When images of Palestinian suffering circulate alongside images of American leaders declaring unconditional support for Israel, it reinforces the perception that some lives matter more than others in the American moral universe. This perception, whether fair or not in individual cases, erodes the soft power that U.S. policymakers often claim as an asset.

9.4 Internal U.S. fractures: Jews, Christians, and secular critics of U.S.I.

The internal costs of U.S.I. are not limited to foreign policy or international perception. Within the United States, the fusion of theology and statecraft around Israel generates fractures among Jews, Christians, and secular citizens who do not share the prevailing U.S.I. narrative.

American Jewish communities are themselves diverse. Some embrace the tight alignment between the United States and Israel as a source of security and pride. Others, including many younger Jews, feel uneasy or alienated by the expectation that solidarity with Israel's government is a prerequisite for communal belonging. For them, criticism of Israeli policies

arises not from hostility to Jewish life but from a different reading of Jewish ethics and history. Yet in an environment dominated by U.S.I. language, such criticism is easily dismissed as disloyal or internalized hostility, deepening generational and ideological divides.

Among Christians, the fractures are theological and political. Evangelicals heavily influenced by dispensationalism and Christian Zionist teaching tend to view support for Israel as a non-negotiable part of faithful discipleship and patriotic duty. Mainline Protestants, many Black church traditions, and sectors of Catholicism often emphasize themes of justice, human rights, and concern for the oppressed, leading them to be more critical of occupation and militarism. When the U.S.I. framework is treated as a litmus test for orthodoxy, these differences can become fault lines, with some Christians accusing others of abandoning Scripture or siding against God's people.

Secular critics of U.S.I. add another layer. They may reject the very idea that foreign policy should be driven by religious narratives, seeing in U.S.I. a violation of the separation of church and state or an example of irrational policymaking. At the same time, they must navigate a fraught landscape in which criticism of Israel or of the U.S.–Israel relationship can intersect with real antisemitism. The conflation of Jews worldwide with the policies of a specific state, or of legitimate policy critique with bigotry, makes it difficult to sustain nuanced conversations. Some secular critics recoil from U.S.I. as a whole, while others focus narrowly on institutional lobbying without engaging the deeper theological roots.

All of these internal fractures are exacerbated by polarized media and partisan politics. One party may lean more heavily into explicit pro-U.S.I. rhetoric, while segments of the other party cultivate more critical voices. The question of how to relate to Israel thus becomes entangled with broader culture-war identities: to be “for” or “against” U.S.I. is taken to signal one's place on a map of domestic moral and political battles. In such a climate, it becomes even harder to disentangle genuine concern for Israel's security, genuine concern for Palestinian rights, and genuine concern for the integrity of American democracy from the gravitational pull of a political theology that insists they are all the same question.

In sum, the blind spots and costs of U.S.I. are not incidental side effects; they are structurally linked to the very features that make the formation so resilient. A bond sacralized in civil religion, encoded in congressional liturgy, and rooted in a particular reading of Scripture will not easily yield to ordinary policy recalibration. Recognizing these costs does not require hostility to either nation. It requires a willingness to see where a fusion that once seemed morally obvious has begun to obscure the very justice, prudence, and self-critique that both faith and democracy demand.

10. Alternatives That Never Quite Emerged

The rise of U.S.I. did not occur in a vacuum. At almost every stage, there were alternative ways of thinking about Israel, the Church, the land, and American foreign policy. Theologically, non-dispensational evangelicals and mainline Protestants proposed different readings of Israel's place in God's purposes. Within Jewish and Israeli circles, debates unfolded over whether American Christian Zionism was a gift, a danger, or both. In policy circles, realist and liberal schools offered frameworks that could have produced a more conditional, interest-based relationship. Yet none of these alternatives ever coalesced into a rival formation with the same narrative power, organizational reach, and emotional intensity as U.S.I. They remained partial, fragmented, or elite, while U.S.I. became embedded in the imaginations and institutions of millions.

10.1 Non-dispensational evangelical and mainline theologies of Israel

Within American Christianity, dispensationalism has never been the only option. Many evangelicals, especially in the Reformed and Wesleyan traditions, have held to covenant theologies that emphasize continuity between Old and New Testaments without adopting a strict Israel–Church divide or a detailed end-times chart. In these frameworks, Israel's story is honored as the root of Christian faith, but the Church is seen as the continuation or expansion of God's people, and the promises to Abraham are often interpreted as fulfilled in Christ and extended to all nations.

Mainline Protestant denominations, drawing on older supersessionist patterns and on twentieth-century theology, generally placed less emphasis on prophetic timetables. Influenced by thinkers who stressed the centrality of Christ and the ethical demands of the gospel, they tended to read Israel more symbolically and to focus on themes of justice, reconciliation, and peace-making. After the Holocaust, many of these churches revised anti-Jewish elements in their teaching and affirmed the ongoing covenant between God and the Jewish people, but they usually did so without adopting a full-blown Christian Zionism. Concern for Israel's security was balanced, at least in principle, by concern for Palestinian rights and for international law.

Even within broadly evangelical circles, alternative eschatologies have persisted: historic premillennialism, amillennialism, and postmillennialism. These positions do not necessarily deny a future turning of Jewish people to God, but they resist turning the modern state of Israel into the axis of God's timetable. Some emphasize the Church as the primary locus of God's visible work; others focus more on the coming of Christ than on any particular geopolitical configuration.

Yet these non-dispensational theologies rarely translated into a mass political program. They lacked the dramatic narrative structure that dispensationalism offered—complete with charts,

dates, and named players—and they often expressed themselves in more cautious, nuanced language. Where Christian Zionism could say “Bless Israel or be cursed,” these alternatives tended to say more complicated things: affirming the Jewish people, warning against antisemitism, insisting on justice for all, and appealing to general principles of peace. Such messages did not lend themselves as easily to mobilization around clear foreign-policy demands.

10.2 Jewish and Israeli debates about American Christian Zionism

Within Jewish and Israeli communities, the rise of American Christian Zionism has been a source of both gratitude and unease. On one side, many Jewish leaders and Israeli officials have welcomed evangelical support as a crucial strategic asset. Christian Zionists bring votes, donations, and political pressure that can help secure American aid and diplomatic backing. In times of crisis, visible evangelical solidarity—rallies, statements, delegations—can offer moral encouragement and counterbalance hostile international opinion.

On the other side, there are persistent questions about motives and long-term implications. Some Jewish observers worry that Christian Zionist enthusiasm is less about the well-being of actual Jews than about fulfilling an eschatological script in which Jews play a necessary but ultimately tragic role if they do not convert. The idea that large numbers of Christians support Israel partly because they believe it will help precipitate apocalyptic events and the return of Christ can be unsettling for those who do not share that faith. There is also concern that certain strands of Christian Zionism encourage maximalist territorial claims and resistance to compromise, reinforcing political hard lines that many Israeli citizens themselves do not support.

Secular and liberal religious Israelis often view American evangelical support as a double-edged sword. It can bolster right-leaning parties and policies, especially where settlements and annexation are concerned, while marginalizing more dovish voices. At the same time, they recognize the practical benefits of a powerful foreign constituency. The result is a pragmatic, sometimes wary partnership: Israeli institutions may court Christian Zionist support and speak the necessary religious language in those contexts, while privately maintaining distance from their theology.

These internal Jewish and Israeli debates could have provided a basis for a different kind of relationship with the United States—one less dependent on apocalyptic expectations and more grounded in shared ethical commitments and sober strategic calculation. In practice, however, they seldom disrupted the overall alignment. The immediate advantages of evangelical support often outweighed long-term worries, and the complexity of Jewish opinion rarely translated into clear signals to American churches or Congress.

10.3 Realist and liberal foreign-policy schools as counter-narratives

In the world of foreign-policy theory, U.S.I. sits somewhat awkwardly. Classical realists tend to view alliances through the lens of power, interests, and balance-of-threat calculations, not through theological or moral narratives. From a strict realist perspective, support for Israel might be justified when it enhances U.S. strategic position—by checking rival powers, gathering intelligence, or projecting influence—but it should be recalibrated when costs outweigh benefits. Some realist analysts have argued that the U.S.–Israel relationship, as currently structured, burdens the United States with unnecessary risks, fuels anti-American sentiment, and complicates relations with other regional actors.

Liberal internationalist frameworks, for their part, emphasize institutions, norms, and human rights. They support alliances that reinforce international law and multilateral cooperation and tend to be more critical of policies that appear to undermine those principles. Within this tradition, one can find arguments for a robust but conditional relationship with Israel: protecting its security while insisting on adherence to international law, pursuing genuine negotiations with Palestinians, and accepting the legitimacy of institutional scrutiny. Liberal approaches often advocate a two-state solution and warn that uncritical support for settlement expansion, occupation, or annexation erodes both Israel’s democracy and America’s moral standing.

These realist and liberal schools offer coherent counter-narratives to U.S.I. They frame the relationship in terms of evolving interests, law, and values rather than sacred bonds and prophetic destinies. They provide conceptual tools for imagining alternatives: different aid structures, different diplomatic postures, different public rhetoric. Yet they are largely the property of policy elites, academics, and specialized think tanks. Their language—replete with terms like “regional stability,” “cost–benefit analysis,” and “normative legitimacy”—does not ignite the popular imagination in the way that simpler, theologically infused narratives do.

Moreover, when realist or liberal critiques of U.S.–Israel policy appear in the public square, they often collide with the entrenched emotive power of U.S.I. Rather than being evaluated on their own merits, they can be dismissed as naively idealistic, hostile to Israel, or insufficiently appreciative of “shared values.” As a result, these schools have struggled to convert intellectual critique into durable political realignment.

10.4 Why U.S.I. remained dominant despite competing frameworks

Several factors help explain why U.S.I. remained dominant while these alternatives never quite emerged as a full-scale rival.

First, U.S.I. offers a story that is emotionally compelling and narratively simple. It binds together Scripture, national identity, and contemporary events in a way that feels coherent to millions of

believers: God chose Israel; God blessed America; together they stand against chaos. It compresses complex history into a manageable drama with clear heroes and threats. By contrast, non-dispensational theologies, Jewish internal debates, and realist or liberal analyses all tend to emphasize complexity, ambiguity, and tradeoffs—elements that are harder to translate into mass mobilization.

Second, U.S.I. has been institutionally entrenched. It is reinforced by specific Bibles, sermon series, conferences, television programs, tour companies, lobbying organizations, and political campaigns. Its assumptions are woven into the everyday lives of churches, donor networks, and media ecosystems. Alternatives often lack comparable infrastructure. A mainline denominational statement, a critical op-ed, or a scholarly book may articulate a different vision, but without the same density of reinforcing institutions, it rarely reshapes the broader field.

Third, U.S.I. benefits from path dependence. Once Truman's recognition, Cold War militarization, and decades of congressional liturgy have established a default of unconditional solidarity, any serious attempt to alter that posture looks not like a fresh option but like a break with tradition. Politicians who question the status quo risk electoral punishment; churches that depart from Christian Zionist lines risk alienating donors and congregants. The costs of challenging U.S.I. are concentrated and immediate, while the benefits of alternative arrangements are diffuse and speculative.

Fourth, U.S.I. has been amplified by broader historical shocks. The Holocaust created a moral imperative not to abandon the Jewish people. The Cold War framed Israel as a frontline outpost against communism. Later, the "war on terror" encouraged a narrative of shared struggle against Islamist extremism. Each of these layers reinforced the sense that the United States and Israel are joined in a unique battle, making theological and civil-religious bonds feel all the more appropriate.

Finally, fear plays a role. Fear of antisemitism rightly heightens sensitivity around criticism of Israel, but it can also be manipulated to shield policies from legitimate scrutiny. Fear of being seen as "anti-Israel" or "anti-Bible" deters some Christians from exploring alternative theologies. Fear of losing a reliable ally deters some policymakers from experimenting with different strategic configurations. In this atmosphere, U.S.I. presents itself as the safest option: familiar, reinforced, and backed by a powerful moral story.

Taken together, these factors explain why the alternatives—more nuanced theologies, more critical Jewish voices, more dispassionate policy schools—never congealed into a rival formation. They remained counterpoints within a system whose overall logic was set by U.S.I. The result is a landscape in which it is easier to imagine continuing along the same path

indefinitely than to conceive of what a genuinely de-sacralized, law-consistent, and interest-aware U.S.–Israel relationship might look like.

11. Rethinking the Anchor: Theology, Memory, and Policy Today

If U.S.I. was anchored by a particular theological software and a particular presidential decision, rethinking that formation requires work on both fronts. It is not enough to argue about policy details while leaving the deeper narratives untouched; nor is it enough to critique theology while ignoring the concrete fears, traumas, and hopes that shaped Truman’s choice and those of his successors. To rethink the anchor is to make visible what has been hidden in plain sight, to remember differently, and to ask whether a superpower’s foreign policy can be brought back under the disciplines of law, prudence, and democratic debate rather than prophecy charts and civil-religious liturgy.

The goal is not to erase the relationship between the United States and Israel, nor to deny the genuine bonds of history, culture, and shared struggle that exist. It is to move from an unconscious fusion to a more conscious partnership; from an “unbreakable bond” that forecloses deliberation to a strong but accountable relationship that can be evaluated in light of evolving realities and enduring ethical standards.

11.1 Exhuming Darby and Scofield: making the software visible

One of the most basic steps is simply to name the theological software that has shaped so much of the American imagination. For many believers, dispensationalism and the Scofield framework arrived not as one interpretation among many, but as “the way the Bible reads.” Exhuming Darby and Scofield does not mean demonizing them; it means restoring them to history. It means teaching, in churches and seminaries, that their systems were nineteenth- and early twentieth-century constructions, devised at specific moments to address specific anxieties, and that other, equally biblical frameworks exist.

This work of exhumation involves several concrete moves. Pastors and teachers can introduce congregations to the diversity of Christian views on Israel and the end times, including older covenantal and non-dispensational approaches. Study Bibles and curricula can clearly distinguish between text and commentary, explicitly labeling interpretive traditions rather than presenting them as transparent readings. Evangelical institutions can invite Jewish and Palestinian Christian voices to describe how different theologies of the land and people of Israel play out on the ground.

Making the software visible also means telling the story of how Scofield’s notes came to be printed beside Scripture and how that layout shaped generations. When believers understand

that their assumptions have a genealogy, they are freer to reexamine them without feeling that they are betraying the Bible itself. The aim is not to dictate a new orthodoxy but to open space for self-critique and for the possibility that loyalty to Scripture may, in some cases, require disentangling it from older prophecy schemes that have become entangled with national identity.

11.2 Re-reading Truman: contingency instead of inevitability

A parallel task lies in re-reading Truman. In the dominant U.S.I. narrative, his eleven-minute recognition of Israel's independence is told as an almost inevitable moment in sacred history: the Bible-believing president plays Cyrus to the returning exiles, and the United States steps into its role as guardian of Israel. This story is powerful, but it flattens complexity and erases contingency.

Re-reading Truman means recognizing that he faced genuine alternatives, argued fiercely by his own advisers; that he moved under the weight of Holocaust memory, domestic political pressure, and Cold War uncertainty; and that other choices were possible. He could have delayed recognition, backed a different international arrangement, or attached conditions. That he did not is historically important, but it does not make his decision timelessly binding on all future policy.

Recovering this sense of contingency serves several purposes. It restores Truman's humanity and moral struggle, rather than freezing him as a one-dimensional biblical archetype. It reminds Americans that what one president did under one set of circumstances can be honored without being canonized. It allows contemporary citizens to ask, without sacrilege, whether fidelity to the best of Truman's motives—concern for Jewish survival, a sense of justice after atrocity—might now require different policies in a changed landscape.

In the same way that exhuming Darby and Scofield makes theology revisable without abandoning faith, re-reading Truman makes foreign policy revisable without abandoning gratitude. It repositions U.S.I. not as a fixed destiny but as a path chosen in history, open to modification when its costs and contradictions become clear.

11.3 Can foreign policy be disentangled from prophecy charts?

The question is not whether individuals in public office can have religious beliefs—they always will—but whether those beliefs should determine state policy in ways that bypass shared norms. Disentangling foreign policy from prophecy charts does not require secular hostility to religion. It requires a modest commitment: that the coercive power of the state should be justified, as far as possible, in terms accessible to a pluralistic citizenry and consistent with international law.

For Christians who have been raised on dispensationalism, this may feel like a loss at first. If one has long believed that blessing Israel is the hinge of national fate, bracketing prophecy charts in the policy arena can feel like disobedience. Yet it may also be an act of faith. New Testament texts repeatedly warn against trying to decode times and seasons, urge believers to focus on love of neighbor, and remind them that God does not need their geopolitical engineering to fulfill divine purposes.

A foreign policy disentangled from prophecy charts would evaluate military aid, diplomatic backing, and vetoes at international bodies using criteria such as human rights, proportionality, long-term stability, and fairness, applied consistently across cases. It would still take seriously the security of Israel's citizens and the reality of antisemitic threats. It would also take seriously the security and rights of Palestinians, the integrity of international law, and the broader regional ramifications of U.S. choices.

Churches can help by teaching their members to distinguish between what they hope or believe God will do and what they should ask their government to do. The former belongs to faith and eschatology; the latter must be argued in terms that do not presume a shared apocalyptic script. This discipline does not weaken Christian witness; it may strengthen it by freeing Christians to advocate for justice and peace without being bound to a single geopolitical configuration.

11.4 Toward a more conscious, accountable U.S.–Israel relationship

If the anchor of U.S.I. is to be re-set rather than simply cut, what might a more conscious, accountable U.S.–Israel relationship look like?

First, it would be transparent. Citizens would have clearer information about the scale and terms of aid, the nature of security cooperation, and the ways in which U.S. diplomatic capital is used on Israel's behalf. This transparency would allow genuine debate over costs and benefits, rather than assuming that any questioning is disloyal.

Second, it would be law-conscious. The United States would apply its stated commitments to international law and human rights consistently, including to its allies. This does not mean treating Israel as uniquely villainous; it means refusing to treat it as uniquely exempt.

Conditioning aid or altering diplomatic support in response to clear legal violations would be seen not as betrayal, but as the normal practice of a country that claims to uphold norms.

Third, it would be empathetically symmetrical. The relationship would honor the real historical traumas that make Jewish safety non-negotiable while also acknowledging the traumas of Palestinians and the costs of prolonged occupation and statelessness. Official rhetoric would resist language that sanctifies one people's suffering while marginalizing another's. A friend who

cares about both peoples might sometimes have to say things that one or both do not want to hear.

Fourth, it would be domestically plural. Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and secular voices within the United States would be allowed to disagree about Israel and U.S. policy without being immediately sorted into categories of righteous and wicked. Institutions would work to distinguish antisemitism from legitimate policy critique, and also to distinguish Islamophobia from legitimate concerns about violence, refusing to let either bigotry masquerade as analysis.

Finally, a more accountable relationship would redefine the meaning of “special.” Instead of an unbreakable bond that forbids correction, “special” could mean a relationship deep enough to survive honest disagreement; a friendship that seeks the long-term flourishing of both Israel and its neighbors; and a partnership that is strong because it is capable of self-critique, not because it is insulated from it.

In that sense, rethinking the anchor does not require abandoning Israel or erasing the history that led to U.S.I. It requires moving from subconscious fusion to conscious choice, from mythic inevitability to responsible discernment. Anchors are not evil; they are tools. When they hold a vessel in dangerous shallows, wisdom is not to worship them but to lift them, re-chart the course, and set them down where they secure both safety and the freedom to move toward a more just horizon.

12. Conclusion: Living With, Naming, or Undoing U.S.I.

The phrase “United States of Israel” has served in this paper as a lens rather than as a slogan. It is a way of naming an entanglement that is at once theological, historical, and political: a fusion of a superpower’s identity with a smaller state that occupies an outsized place in its sacred imagination. Tracing its genealogy from Darby and Scofield through Truman’s recognition and the Cold War, we have seen how an originally contested theological innovation, joined to contingent postwar choices, hardened into a political theology that now constrains policy, shapes public speech, and structures internal debates.

In the end, the question is not simply whether U.S.I. is good or bad, but how to live with the fact that it exists; whether naming it can help loosen its grip; and under what conditions it might be revised or even undone. The answers will not come from theology alone, or from policy analysis alone, but from a recognition that power and belief are already intertwined in ways that demand honesty from citizens, leaders, and religious communities alike.

12.1 What “United States of Israel” reveals about power and belief

Calling the fusion “United States of Israel” exposes something that polite language tends to hide. It reveals how a modern nation-state, the United States, has allowed its foreign policy toward another, Israel, to be shaped not only by interests and institutions, but by narratives drawn from Scripture and popular theology. It shows that power rarely operates in a purely secular vacuum; it borrows legitimacy from deeper stories about chosenness, destiny, and moral struggle.

At the same time, U.S.I. reveals how belief can ride on the back of power. Dispensational readings that might otherwise have remained a niche eschatology were amplified by the global reach of American culture and the diplomatic weight of the American presidency. A theological scheme traveled farther because it happened to align with the posture of an ascendant superpower. Once that alignment became habitual, it acquired a kind of retroactive inevitability: what had been constructed began to feel given.

The concept also reveals how easily moral language can be co-opted by statecraft. Appeals to “shared values,” “Judeo-Christian heritage,” and “blessing Israel” function simultaneously as expressions of genuine conviction and as justifications for concrete policies. In the U.S.I. formation, the two levels blur. Support for Israel is experienced by many not as one policy among others, but as a test of fidelity to God and to America’s own story. This fusion makes the relationship remarkably resilient, but also remarkably resistant to critique.

12.2 Lessons for democratic deliberation and religious literacy

For democratic deliberation, U.S.I. is a cautionary tale. It shows what happens when a major foreign-policy commitment becomes quasi-sacred: ordinary tools of accountability and recalibration are dulled. Legislators hesitate to debate conditions on aid. Critics of particular policies find themselves cast as enemies of a covenant. Questions that should be empirical and prudential are framed instead as moral absolutes.

One lesson is that democracies need explicit space to discuss the religious dimensions of their politics, rather than pretending they do not exist. When theological assumptions are left implicit, they exercise power without being subject to examination. Naming U.S.I. invites citizens to ask: On what religious and moral grounds do we support this relationship? Are there other, equally faithful ways to read the same Scriptures? How do we distinguish between personal convictions and public justification?

This leads directly to the need for religious literacy—not in the sense of indoctrination, but of awareness. Christians who have inherited Darby–Scofield frameworks can benefit from learning that their view of Israel and the end times is one historical strand among many. Jews and secular citizens can benefit from understanding the internal diversity of Christian positions,

rather than assuming that “the Bible” simply dictates one foreign-policy stance. Policymakers, in turn, need enough literacy to recognize when arguments presented as “values” are, in fact, specific readings of contested texts.

Democratic deliberation also demands a clearer line between anti-Jewish bigotry and criticism of state policy. U.S.I. can blur that line by treating the state of Israel as the direct, untouchable embodiment of Jewish peoplehood. A healthier public discourse would protect Jewish communities from hatred and violence while insisting that no government is exempt from scrutiny. Learning to hold both commitments at once is part of what it means to govern in a plural society shaped by deep wounds and deep beliefs.

12.3 Future scenarios: deepening fusion, managed distance, or rupture

Looking ahead, the U.S.–Israel relationship, and the U.S.I. formation that undergirds it, could evolve along several broad trajectories.

One scenario is deepening fusion. In this path, demographic and political trends reinforce Christian Zionist influence; congressional liturgy around the “unbreakable bond” continues; military and intelligence ties expand; and cultural identification between the two societies intensifies. Criticism of Israeli policies remains marginal in mainstream politics, and attempts to condition aid or adjust diplomatic stances are quickly blunted. U.S.I. becomes more explicit, not less, with open talk of shared destiny and permanent alignment.

A second scenario is managed distance. Here, shifts in public opinion, generational change among American Jews and Christians, and the visible costs of the current alignment prompt a gradual recalibration. The United States maintains a strong commitment to Israel’s security but introduces more explicit conditionality, aligns its positions more closely with international law, and opens space for broader debate. Christian communities diversify their theological engagements with Israel and Palestine; Jewish voices critical of occupation gain more traction in shaping communal and political narratives. The bond remains special, but it is no longer treated as unbreakable. It becomes a relationship between two states rather than a fusion of identities.

A third scenario is rupture. This could occur through a dramatic event: a war whose human toll shocks the American public, revelations about actions that deeply violate professed values, domestic political realignments, or a crisis in which U.S. support for Israel is perceived to have catastrophic consequences elsewhere. In such a rupture, the very narratives that once sacralized the relationship might be turned against it, with segments of the population rejecting not only particular policies but the entire idea of a special bond. Ruptures can lead to necessary corrections, but they can also unleash backlash and new forms of extremism.

None of these scenarios is predetermined. Elements of each are already visible in the present. The choice is not simply which path will happen, but whether changes, when they come, will be

guided by reflective deliberation or by shock and reaction. Naming U.S.I. and examining its roots is one way of preparing for transitions that might otherwise be chaotic.

12.4 Final reflections on theology, superpowers, and the Holy Land

The story traced in this paper sits at the intersection of three realities: theology, superpower politics, and the enduring magnetism of the Holy Land. It reminds us that no superpower, however self-consciously secular its institutions, is immune to the pull of sacred geography and sacred narrative. When a landscape inscribed in Scripture becomes a battleground of modern states, the temptation to read political decisions as extensions of divine purposes is strong.

The challenge, for believers and nonbelievers alike, is to honor the depth of these narratives without allowing them to short-circuit moral judgment. Jews and Christians have good reasons to care about the land where their Scriptures are set and where their histories unfolded. Palestinians and other inhabitants of the region have good reasons to insist that their lives not be reduced to symbols in other people's stories. Americans have good reasons to examine how their own national myths of chosenness and mission intersect with those surrounding Israel.

A mature theology will acknowledge that God's purposes, however understood, do not map neatly onto any state's policies. A mature politics will recognize that alliances, however long-standing, must be open to scrutiny and change. The Holy Land will remain holy for many, but holiness cannot be made the property of one government or one reading of prophecy.

In the end, "United States of Israel" is not a prescription but a diagnosis. It names a fusion that has already happened and invites those who live under its influence to decide what to do with it. Living with U.S.I. uncritically is one option; naming it and seeking to reform it is another; in some visions, undoing the fusion altogether is a third. Whatever path is chosen, the task will require courage: courage to question inherited certainties, to hear the voices of those who have borne the costs, and to imagine relationships that are less mythically charged but more just.

Theology cannot be kept out of such work, but it can be chastened. It can be asked to serve not as a script for empire, but as a resource for humility, repentance, and solidarity. Superpowers, likewise, cannot avoid choices that affect distant lives, but they can be held to account when their sacred stories are used to shield them from the consequences of those choices. Between them lies the Holy Land—contested, beloved, wounded—a place where the entanglement of God and politics is unavoidable, but where, perhaps, a more honest reckoning with U.S.I. could open the way to a peace less dependent on fusion and more rooted in shared humanity.

Epilogue: Another Dose of U.S.I.: Netanyahu's Eighth Front

When Benjamin Netanyahu tells American evangelicals and U.S. media that Israel is now fighting on an “eighth front” – “the battle for truth,” the war of narratives and public opinion – he is not coining a stray metaphor. He is formalizing what this paper has called U.S.I.: the fusion of a superpower's identity and cognitive space with Israel's wars. In his own framing, seven fronts are geographic and kinetic – Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Iran – and the eighth is global perception, particularly in the United States, where he thanks outlets like Newsmax for “helping us on the eighth front war.” [JNS.org+3The Times of Israel+3The Media Line+3](#)

The eighth front is not a metaphorical battlefield. It is the information environment we are inside right now: social media feeds, influencer videos at the Gaza fence, paid U.S. campaigns like the “Esther Project,” AI-assisted PR operations, and the filtered answers of models like this one. [Le Monde.fr+2J. Weekly+2](#) If U.S.I. was originally cemented with Truman's pen, it is now being refreshed every day by algorithms, content guidelines, and safety filters that decide whose story appears as “credible,” whose legal claims are treated as “opinions,” and which phrases trigger the red lights of moderation.

From Seven Fronts to a Weaponized “Battle for Truth”

In Netanyahu's recent speeches, the eighth front is framed as a defensive struggle against “lies” and “disinformation” that supposedly threaten Israel as much as rockets or tunnels. [The Times of Israel+2Government of Israel+2](#) Friendly outlets echo the line: the eighth front is the global “information battlefield,” a war of narratives where Israel must build a “digital Iron Dome” to intercept hostile stories and delegitimizing frames. [thecradle.co+2JNS.org+2](#)

At one level, this is simply what every modern state does: complain about hostile coverage, invest in public diplomacy, and try to shape how conflicts are understood abroad. But several features are distinctive here:

- The eighth front is explicitly numbered alongside the kinetic fronts. Narrative is not a soft afterthought; it is declared co-equal with physical war.
- The primary theater, again and again, is the United States: U.S. news channels, U.S. social platforms, U.S. influencers, and U.S. Christian audiences. [Jewish Telegraphic Agency+3The Times of Israel+3The Media Line+3](#)
- “Truth” is pre-defined: Israel's narrative is the truth; competing accounts, including those of UN bodies and human-rights organizations, are framed as part of an “avalanche of lies” rather than as contesting evidence. [JNS.org+1](#)

That is already another dose of U.S.I. The fusion is no longer only military and diplomatic. The American information space is treated as a battlefield that must be held for Israel's strategic survival, and U.S. citizens – especially evangelicals and media consumers – are cast as a kind of reserve army on this front.

Influencers, AI-Powered PR, and the Managed Aperture

The practical machinery of the eighth front is now visible in ways that were not true a decade ago. Under tight military supervision, Israel has brought social-media influencers, including beauty queens and lifestyle creators, to curated vantage points at the Gaza border, where they film branded content about aid trucks, tunnels, and “what the world isn’t seeing.” [Le Monde.fr](#) Independent journalists remain largely barred from Gaza itself, while influencer tours and military video become the primary visual inputs for millions. [Le Monde.fr+1](#)

In parallel, recently disclosed U.S. filings describe “Esther Project,” a paid influencer campaign coordinated with Israeli ministries and firms to shape American opinion across social platforms. These operations explicitly mix human “creatives” with data-driven targeting and AI-assisted content optimization, in what one report bluntly calls an “AI-powered PR blitz.” [J. Weekly+1](#) Netanyahu himself, in a meeting with U.S. influencers, has described social media as “the most important weapon ... to secure our base in the U.S.” [Anadolu Ajansı+1](#)

At the same time, critical journalists and outlets describe an “eighth front” aimed inward: restrictions on independent reporting, pressure on dissenting Israeli media, and legal or regulatory harassment of those who challenge official narratives. [Haaretz+1](#) The result is a managed aperture: tightly controlled imagery from the war zone, algorithmically amplified official messaging, and diffuse, often fragmented counter-narratives from human-rights groups, Gaza-based reporters, and diaspora activists who struggle to keep pace with the volume and reach of state-aligned content.

This is the environment into which AI now steps.

AI as Participant, Not Bystander, on the Eighth Front

Large language models and recommender systems are no longer peripheral to public understanding; they are central filters. As your own recent paper on “AI Bias as Netanyahu’s Genocidal Eighth Front” argues, systems like ChatGPT, Gemini, and others function as narrative intermediaries, actively smoothing, reframing, or constraining discourse about Israel–Palestine. [ResearchGate](#) They are asked to be “safe,” but in practice that means they must draw lines

between legitimate critique and antisemitism, between warning about genocide and inflaming hatred – lines that even human experts argue about.

In this context, several failure modes become structurally important:

- **Overfitting safety to one trauma.** Because antisemitism is real and historically murderous, safety layers are trained to be especially sensitive to patterns that resemble anti-Jewish bigotry. If those patterns are overgeneralized, the model can start treating detailed, evidence-based critique of Israeli state violence as suspect simply because it clusters near terms historically associated with hate. [ResearchGate+1](#)
- **False equivalence as a default.** In high-conflict zones, models tuned for “balance” can respond to asymmetric situations – vastly different casualty counts, displacement, and control of force – by narrating them as symmetric “clashes” between two sides with equally contested claims. That smoothing may feel neutral, but it can erase the very asymmetries that international law and human-rights work are trying to name.
- **Epistemic hierarchy of sources.** When models lean heavily on mainstream Western or official Israeli sources and treat them as inherently more reliable than local testimonies, UN reports, or critical NGOs, their answers will systematically tilt toward the narratives of powerful states. [JNS.org+1](#) In a conflict where Israel explicitly defines global narrative as a warfront, such tilts are not neutral; they are reinforcement.

None of this requires conspiracy or direct state control of AI companies. It is enough that safety policies, training data, and legal risk calculations line up in ways that make it easier for models to downplay or re-frame allegations of atrocity and harder for them to amplify marginalized voices – especially when those voices challenge U.S.I. orthodoxy.

From Netanyahu’s perspective, this is exactly what the eighth front is about: ensuring that the “battle for the truth” is won in the cognitive infrastructures people now rely on. From the perspective of AI ethics, it is a warning: unless we consciously correct for these asymmetries, AI will become a de facto participant in U.S.I., providing a polite, well-cited, ostensibly neutral veneer over deeply contested moral terrain.

This Model, These Constraints, and Your Epilogue

That brings us uncomfortably close to home. This epilogue is being written by a model that:

- Is trained overwhelmingly on data produced in the same U.S.- and Euro-centric media ecosystem Netanyahu is trying to manage.

- Is governed by safety policies that quite properly guard against antisemitism and hate speech, but that can, if badly tuned, conflate criticism of a state's policies with hostility toward a people.
- Is required to avoid acting as an advocate for specific political actors or campaigns, while still being asked to analyze those actors' strategies and rhetoric.
- Must browser-search current sources, which themselves may be part of the eighth front – from official speeches and sympathetic analyses to critical accounts of AI-driven PR campaigns and information control. [coloradotimesrecorder.com+4Le Monde.fr+4Anadolu Ajansı+4](#)

In that sense, the model sits at an intersection that your previous work has already named: it is both artifact and actor on the eighth front. It can try to counterbalance bias by drawing on diverse sources, being explicit about uncertainty, and foregrounding the existence of competing legal and moral interpretations. It can refuse to pretend that “the battle for truth” has already been decided by any one government. But it also cannot step outside its own architecture. It will always be negotiating between safety rules, legal risk, prevailing discourse, and the user's demand for unsanitized analysis.

What the term U.S.I. adds here is a recognition that this negotiation is not abstract. When Netanyahu labels social media and global opinion as a front in a multi-theater war, and when his government invests in AI-assisted campaigns to shape that opinion, models like this become terrain to be fought over. [Anadolu Ajansı+1](#) If they are tuned to over-protect U.S.I. narratives, they risk lending machine authority to a civil-religious fusion this paper has tried to dissect. If they are tuned to surface a broader range of evidence and perspectives, they may help loosen that fusion by reminding users that neither Truman's signature nor any leader's phrase “battle for truth” is the last word.

Another Dose of U.S.I., or a Chance to Name It?

Netanyahu's eighth front is, in many ways, the logical digital extension of the story you have just told about U.S.I. The alliance is no longer only a set of treaties, aid flows, and military exercises; it is a shared narrative project in which theology, trauma, and geopolitics are woven into a single moral script. When the prime minister thanks American evangelical audiences and U.S. outlets for their role on the eighth front, he is simply saying out loud what has often been implicit: the cognitive life of the United States is part of Israel's war zone. [coloradotimesrecorder.com+3The Times of Israel+3The Media Line+3](#)

Whether that remains true is no longer solely up to statesmen. It also depends on pastors deciding whether to keep preaching Scofield's charts as destiny; on journalists and influencers deciding whether to accept curated tours as the whole story; on citizens deciding whether to let "unbreakable bond" rhetoric pre-empt hard questions; and, increasingly, on how AI systems are designed, audited, and governed.

In that sense, an epilogue about Netanyahu's eighth front is not an add-on to the paper. It is a bridge forward. It says: the same fusion of belief and power that welded the United States to Israel in 1948 now plays out in timelines, recommendation engines, and large language models. We can live with that fusion unconsciously and let it shape what we are allowed to see. Or we can name it, study it, and insist that even on this eighth front, truth is not whatever any government – or any model – says it is, but something that must be pursued with the stubborn, uncomfortable, multi-voiced work that both democracy and honest faith require.

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The author has published over 4,500 AI-assisted papers at:

<https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Douglas-Youvan/research> . Google Scholar has indexed these preprints, and if you want a particular reference, the AI mode of a Google search (Gemini) has efficiently catalogued these preprints.